Two abstract results are given for the existence of optimalcontract selection mechanisms in principal-agent models; by a suitable reformulation of the (almost) incentive compatibility constraint, they deal with both single-and multi-agent models. In particular, it is shown that the existence results in a series of papers by F.H.
Introduction
In a series of papers, F.H. Page presented existence results for optimal contract selection mechanisms for a number of principal-agent models 9, 12, 13]. These models involve both moral hazard and incomplete information aspects (in the sense of e.g. Harsanyi 6 ] and Meyerson 8] ). A quite related existence result was also given by Page for the existence of an optimal Stackelberg strategy in a game with incomplete information 10]. In some form or another, all these models deal with the maximization of the principal's expected utility function Z T U(t; f(t)) (dt) over the set of all contract selection mechanisms f : T ! K that are (i) individually rational and (ii) incentive compatible. Here stands for the principal's subjective probability distribution of the types, T being the set of all types that the agent(s) can report to have. By working with a mechanism f, the principal is committed to using the contract f(t) from K if type t is reported by the agent(s).
The nature of the incentive compatibility constraint (see De nitions 2.1, 2.4), which is imposed so as to induce truthful reporting by the agent(s), causes the existence problem to be quite nonstandard, the constraint of incentive compatibility (used in 10]) presenting a technically more challenging problem than almost sure incentive compatibility 9, 12, 13] . The inherent technical di culties were solved by Page, by adopting the use of an abstract Koml os theorem from 1]. This theorem has the important advantage of supplying almost everywhere pointwise convergence information about arithmetic averages in situations where traditionally only weak convergence information, much more macroscopic in nature, is available. In yet another development, C.M. Khan showed that a less re ned analogue of the abstract Koml os theorem, viz. Mazur's theorem, can be used to deal with the existence question, provided that one weakens the notion of a.s. incentive compatibility considerably. This would seem to con rm a pattern signaled above: the more re ned the incentive compatibility constraint, the more re ned the analysis to solve the associated existence questions must be. Apart from this essential di erence with Page's existence results, another conspicuous contrast is that Khan does not require the set of contracts to be compact. Instead, he imposes monotonicity and other structural conditions upon his utility function (his space of contracts being two-dimensional). However, as Khan himself shows, his incentive compatibility and related conditions force the problem to be equivalent to one with a compact set of contracts. In spite of its more explicit nature, 7] does not provide explicit conditions under which the expected utility functional is upper semi-continuous and existence actually occurs (see 7, p. 126]).
The purpose of the present paper is to produce a systematic, general approach to existence problems involving incentive compatibility. Two principal results are formulated; together they apply to all situations considered by Page in the papers mentioned above, and in other situations as well 3]. The essential steps of the approach all stem from the work by Page. This paper serves to provide a unifying platform for those ideas. Its use of misspeci cation subsets of types seems a new idea. This is used in the de nition of (a.s.) incentive compatibility. Together with the use of a suitable -algebra on the space T of all types, it allows for the simultaneous treatment of single-and multi-agent models.
Principal existence results
The treatment in this section is at a rather high level of abstraction; of course, this is unavoidable if one wishes to bring many applications together. The reader is advised to refer continuously to section 3 for motivation. Proofs of all results in this section can be found in section 4.
Let (T; T ; ) be a probability space; elements of T represent the various types (or typevectors) of the agent(s). Let K be a subset of a Hausdor locally convex topological space E; elements of K will be called contracts, and measurable functions from T into K will be called contract selection mechanisms for the principal. Once she/he adopts the contract selection mechanism f : T ! K, the principal is committed to o ering the contract f(t) upon being reported the type t. Here measurability is de ned with respect to T and the Borel -algebra B(K) on K. As usual, the topological dual of E (i.e., the set of all linear continuous functionals on E) is denoted by E . For x 2 E and x 2 E we shall write < x; x >:= x (x). Assumption 2.1 The set K of contracts is convex compact and metrizable for the relative topology (as inherited from E).
Let ? : T ! 2 K be a multifunction. For a type t agent, ?(t) represents the set of rational contracts for such an agent. No measurability conditions whatsoever will be needed for ?. Assumption 2.2 The set ?(t) K of rational contracts is convex and closed for each t 2 T.
Below we allow for two di erent notions of rationality and incentive compatibility of mechanisms, depending on whether they have to hold surely or just almost surely (with respect to the subjective probability ). For each of these situations we shall present an existence result, respectively in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. We now prepare for the rst of these:
De nition 2.1 (a.s. individual rationality) A contract selection mechanism f is said to be almost surely individually rational if f(t) 2 ?(t) for -almost every t 2 T:
Recall that this states that there exists a subset N in T , with (N) = 0 (i.e., N is a null set for ), such that f(t) 2 ?(t) for all t 2 TnN. Observe that N, the "exceptional null set" for f's pointwise belonging to ?, is allowed to vary with f. Although it is not strictly required, N might be the empty set in some instances (the stronger De nition 2.4
exactly calls for such emptiness). From now on we shall often write "almost every" or even "a.e." instead of the more formal " -almost every". By Note that a type t agent will not have an incentive to misreport under the mechanism f if what he/she gets under the contract f(t) is at least as good as what he/she gets by misreporting his/her type as t 0 . Both these options are evaluated by such an agent via the utility function V (t; ); hence the rst option is worth V (t; f(t)) utils to the agent, and the second one V (t; f(t 0 )) utils. The De nitions 2.2 and 2.5 state that (almost surely) the second utility amount will not exceed the rst one. The following device allows us to treat multi-and single-agent models simultaneously. Let F : T ! 2 T be a misspeci cation multifunction; for each t 2 T, F(t) is the set from which type t agents can opt to misreport to the principal. No form of measurability whatsoever is required for F. In several applications below it is natural to use F(t) T; however, when treating the multi-agent setup it is essential to use a di erent misspeci cation multifunction F.
De nition 2.2 (a.s. incentive compatibility) A contract selection mechanism f is said to be almost surely incentive compatible if for almost every t V (t; f(t)) V (t; f(t 0 )) for all t 0 2 F(t).
This notion is encountered in e.g. 9, 11, 12, 13] . In 7] Khan requires the above inequality to hold only for all t 0 not in some -null set. This would seem to be a weaker and intuitively less convincing notion. Let S as IC denote the set of all mechanisms that are a.s. incentive compatible.
Let U : T K ! ?1; +1) be the principal's utility function. The assumptions to follow allow us to de ne the principal's expected utility function. Namely, the expected utility of the mechanism f 2 S ? is given by
where gives the principal's (subjective) probability distribution of the various types. Assumption 2.4 The principal's utility function U is T B(K)-measurable.
Let us note that instead of product measurability one could do with mere T -measurability of U( ; f( )) for all f 2 S as ? \S as IC (in fact, it would even be possible to abandon measurability for the principal's utility altogether by adopting outer integration 1, 2] Theorem 2.1 Under the Assumptions 2.1{2.7 there exists an optimal mechanism for the principal's utility maximization problem (P as ).
Next, we prepare for a closely related but stronger existence result, for which also stronger conditions are needed.
De nition 2.4 (individual rationality) A contract selection mechanism f is said to be individually rational if f(t) 2 ?(t) for every t 2 T:
By S ? we denote the set of individually rational mechanisms. Clearly, this set is contained in the earlier set S as ? . Note that this new notion of individual rationality no longer depends on the subjective probability distribution . A similar comment applies to the following notion, which ensures that none of the agents has an incentive to misreport her/his type.
De nition 2.5 (incentive compatibility) A contract selection mechanism f is said to be incentive compatible if for all t V (t; f(t)) V (t; f(t 0 )) for all t 0 2 F(t).
By S IC we denote the set of all mechanisms that are incentive compatible. Clearly, S IC is contained in the earlier set S as IC .
Assumption 2.8 The set S ? \S IC of all individually rational, incentive compatible mechanisms is nonempty.
Evidently, this is a little stronger than Assumption 2.7. Moreover, an extra measurability condition will be used for V :
Assumption 2.9 The utility function V is T B(K)-measurable.
De nition 2.6 The principal's maximization problem (P) consists of maximizing the expected utility I U (f) over all mechanisms f in S ? \ S IC .
Theorem 2.2 Under the Assumptions 2.1{2.6, 2.8 and the extra Assumption 2.9 there exists an optimal mechanism for the principal's utility maximization problem (P). This same mechanism is also optimal for (P as ).
In the proof, the optimal mechanism for (P) will come about by suitably modifying the optimal mechanism for (P as ) on the exceptional null set implicit in the de nition of a.s. incentive compatibility. A useful su cient condition for Assumption 2.8 to hold is as follows:
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that the multifunction ? has the following special form:
?(t) := fx 2 K : V (t; x) r(t)g; t 2 T; where r : T ! R is some reservation value function (not necessarily measurable). a. Suppose that ?(t) 6 = ; a.e. Then Assumption 2.7 follows from the other assumptions of Theorem 2.1, provided that Assumption 2.9 holds in addition.
b. Suppose that ?(t) 6 = ; for every t 2 T. Then Assumption 2.8 follows from the other assumptions of Theorem 2.2.
Applications
This section indicates how improvements of the main results of 9, 12, 13] all follow from Theorem 2.1 and how an improvement of the main result of 10] follows from Theorem 2.2. Since it would be most uneconomical to repeat here all the details of the models used in those papers, let us restrict ourselves to the main features of the implementation of the abstract existence results. Also, for each paper the improvements will be mentioned which follow from adopting Theorem 2.1 or 2.2. The reader is expected to ll out the details; in doing so, she/he is warned to observe the fact that no uniform terminology exists concerning the fundamental notions in this area. For instance, "incentive compatibility" in 9] is our present a.s. incentive compatibility (De nition 2.1), and "a.e. incentive compatibility" in 7] is a notion that is weaker than our present a.s. incentive compatibility.
In several applications the contracts will be mixed, i.e., K consists of the set P(Y ) of all probability measures on some topological space Y , equipped with its Borel -algebra. In this situation E is taken to be the set of all bounded signed measures on Y , equipped with the classical narrow topology 5 But once this is known, the usual approximation of u by means of step functions shows that the desired result is also valid for general u. Also, observe that Assumption 2.5 follows very simply from the given inequality for u Under the additional condition for v, validity of Assumption 2.9 is proven in almost the same way as Assumption 2.4, by applying the approximation by step functions to the positive and negative part of v. QED 
Stackelberg games 9]
In 9] Page considers a Stackelberg game with incomplete information in the mixed contract setting of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Also, his de nition of individual rationality is as given in Proposition 2.1. Improving upon Page's existence result for a problem of type (P as ), we shall show that his conditions also allow for an existence result as in Theorem 2.2. In the notation of 9], one should substitute for (T; T ; ) its probability space ( ; ; m), for K the set P(X) of all probability measures on its compact metric space X, for ?(t) its sets P(X(t)), where X( ) is its multifunction de ned on its p. 415 (it is of the kind postulated in Proposition 2.1). Further, we should substitute for v its function f , de ned on p. 414, and for u its function g , as given on p. 418 (correspondingly, our V and U are called F and G in 9]). We use simply F(t) := T = in the de nition of S IC . Let us check that the conditions of Theorem 2.2 apply. Above, we saw that the conditions of Proposition 3.1 hold; also, those of Proposition 3.2 apply: the needed properties of v = f can be found on p. 414 (including the additional measurability) and those of u = g on p. 419. By A-2] in 9], Proposition 2.1.b applies. Therefore, the existence of an optimal mechanism for (P) follows. This improves upon 9, Theorem 5.1], where only the existence of an optimal solution for (P as ) is proven.
Principal-single agent models with incomplete information 10]
In 10] a principal-agent model is given with incomplete information about a single agent. Theorem 2.2 applies to this model, and this leads to at least one improvement. In 10], one should substitute (T; T ; ) for its probability space ( ; B( ); m). In A-1] of 10], is supposed to be a separable metric and complete space, but here we shall not need this topological assumption. We again use here F(t) T. Proposition 
Principal-multiple agent models with incomplete information: mixed contracts 12]
In 12] a multi-agent contract auction model is considered. As announced in section 2, this type of model can be incorporated into the framework of section 2 by an adroit choice of the misspeci cation sets and the -algebra T . Here the fact that Theorem 2.2 does not ask for measurability conditions for V , but only for U, plays a signi cant role. To capture Page's existence result, we substitute for T Page's I (his I indexes the agents, and := i2I i is the set of all type-vectors). This T should be equipped with the special product -algebra T := f;; Ig B( ). Observe that this has the e ect of making Tmeasurable functions depend essentially on the -part only of t = (i; ). 3.4 Principal-multiple agent models with incomplete information: pure contracts 13] This pointwise convergence of the averages continues to hold { with the same f but with varying exceptional null sets { for every subsequence of subsequence (fm).
De ne a j (t; x) :=< x; x j > on T E. For Lemma 4.1 Let (g n ) be a sequence of mechanisms g n : T ! K. Under Assumption 2.1 the multifunction L ! 2 K given by L(t) := \ 1 p=1 closure fg n (t) : n pg;
is measurable.
Proof. Start by noting that for each t 2 T one has x 2 L(t) if and only if there exists a subsequence of (g n (t)) converging to x. Let Let us rede ne f (t) on N: consider the multifunction L : N ! 2 K , given by L(t) := \ 1 p=1 closure fs n (t) : n pg By Lemma 4.1, this multifunction (which we need to consider only on N) is measurable. Evidently, by Assumption 2.1 the values of L are nonempty (use the nite intersection property) and compact. Therefore, L has a measurable selection f : N ! K 4, III.6]. In view of (4.1), all that is needed to nish the proof now is to check that f , thus altered on N, is a.s. incentive compatible. Note that by incentive compatibility of the f m 's and by Assumption 2.3 V (t; s n (t)) V (t; s n (t 0 )) for all t 2 TnN 0 , all t 0 2 F(t) and all n 2 N. (4:2) Here N 0 is a null set; it is the union of all exceptional null sets involved in the a.s. incentive compatibility de nition of the f m 's. Let t 2 Tn(N 0 N) and t 0 2 F(t) be arbitrary. If t 0 6 2 N, then both s n (t) ! f (t) and s n (t 0 ) ! f (t 0 ). Thus, by (4.2) and Assumption 2.3 V (t; f (t)) V (t; f (t 0 )):
If t 0 2 N, then (4.3) holds as well. Indeed, by the alteration of f on N made above, f (t 0 ) is a limit point of (s n (t 0 )) (this is seen easily to be implied by the de nition of the multifunction L; it was also observed in the proof of Lemma 4.1 above). Hence, there exists some subsequence (s n j ) of (s n ) (its dependence on t 0 does not matter for the argument to go through) such that (s n (t 0 )) converges to f (t 0 ). But because t 6 2 N, the sequence (s n j (t)), obtained when the same subsequence is evaluated in the point t, converges to f (t). Using (4.2) this gives V (t; f (t)) V (t; s n j (t)) V (t; s n j (t 0 )) ! V (t; f (t)); so (4.3) follows again. We therefore conclude that f is a.s. incentive compatible. QED For the proof of Theorem 2.2 the following result is also needed. As shown here, when 4, III.39] is restricted to compact-valued multifunctions, it can be sharpened so as to give T -measurability instead of measurability with respect to the -completion of T . Although this is an obvious modi cation, we supply a proof that starts from rst principles. Since each t 7 ! V (t; x j (t)) is evidently T -measurable, so is V max : T ! R, de ned above. by incentive compatibility of the f m 's. Let t 2 T and t 0 2 F(t) be arbitrary. Below we shall distinguish four di erent cases. If t 6 2 N, t 0 6 2 N, then s n (t) ! f (t) and s n (t 0 ) ! f (t 0 ), so (4.6) implies V (t; f (t)) V (t; f (t 0 )):
by Assumption 2.3. Secondly, if t 6 2 N and t 0 2 N, then (4.7) holds as well. Indeed, f (t 0 ) =f(t 0 ) is still a limit point of (s n (t 0 )), so there exists a subsequence (s n j (t 0 )) of (s n (t 0 )) which converges to f (t 0 ). But evaluating at t 6 2 N also gives that (s n j (t)) converges to f (t) = f (t) by (4.5). By (4.6) V (t; f (t)) V (t; s n j (t)) V (t; s n j (t 0 )) ! V (t; f (t)); so (4.7) follows. Conversely, if t 2 N and t 0 6 2 N, then (4.7) holds as well. Indeed, it then reduces to V (t;f(t)) V (t; f (t 0 )), which follows by (4.6) and the "argmax" property oft, since V (t; f (t)) = V (t;f(t)) V (t; s n (t)) V (t; s n (t 0 )) ! V (t; f (t 0 )) again using Assumption 2.3. Fourthly, if both t and t 0 belong to N, then, working with the same subsequence (s n j (t 0 )) as above, we have by (4.6) V (t; f (t) = V (t;f(t)) V (t; s n j (t)) V (t; s n j (t 0 )) ! V (t; f (t)): So (4.7) has been shown to hold in all possible cases. This proves that f is incentive compatible. We conclude that f belongs to S ? \S IC and that I U (f = sup(P). That f should also be optimal for (P as ) is an obvious consequence of its being the modi cation of f , the optimal solution for (P as ), on a null set. QED Proof of Proposition 2.1. By Lemma 4.2 the multifunction t 7 ! arg max x2K V (t; x) is measurable, and has nonempty values (the latter by the Weierstrass theorem). By the measurable selection theorem 4, III.6], this multifunction has a measurable selectionf.
We conclude that V (t;f(t)) = max x2K V (t; x) for all t. Evidently, this impliesf 2 S IC . Also, the nonemptiness hypothesis of part a gives V (t;f(t)) r(t) for a.e. t, and for part b the same inquality holds for all t. QED 
Epilogue
It has been shown that the existence results for several models can be uni ed and derived from essentially two di erent (but related) existence results, viz., Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. To see the essential contours of Page's approach to the existence question for the class of models considered here should not only be useful in studying and classifying Page's work, but also to deal with new, more complex situations. Undoubtedly, the present model should be re ned for that purpose. For instance, as yet the present author has not been able to deduce Page's recent existence results of 11], where a Bayesian multi-agent model is considered, from the present work.
